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In (Faint) Praise of the Large APs:
Comments on Marc Galanter, "Planet of the
APs"
MEIR DAN-COHENt
Some thirty years ago Prof. Galanter published an
article provocatively entitled Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead,' which has been described as "perhaps the most
visible, widely cited, and influential article ever published
in the law and society field. ' 2 Perhaps other than the
"perhaps," this description is exactly on the mark. In that
article, Galanter put on the scholarly agenda a vital and
troubling topic: the systematic advantages that those who
are well-off enjoy in adjudication. In today's lecture Prof.
Galanter revisited this fertile ground, providing us with
much new data that corroborates and amplifies his initial
insights. Yet today's lecture involves not only an update
and an amplification of the older piece, but also a
significant shift of focus.3 At the heart of the lecture lies the
observation that the haves that dominate litigation tend to
be increasingly not individual human beings but artificial
persons, or APs, as Galanter whimsically calls them. The
advantages that organizations enjoy in litigation are in part
due to their greater resources. But they are also due to
organizational factors, such as being repeat-players, having
a rule-governed formal structure that finds the legal
environment particularly congenial, and the availability of
t Milo Reese Robbins Chair in Legal Ethics, Boalt Hall School of Law,
University of California at Berkeley. I'd like to thank my friends and colleagues
Mel Eisenberg and Jesse Fried for their generous assistance.
1. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'y REV. 95 (1974).
2. Joel B. Grossman, Herbert M. Kritzer, & Stewart Macaulay, Do the
"Haves" Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 803, 803 (1999).
3. See Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and
its Users, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 1369 (2006).
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a permanent legal staff. My aim here is to assess this new
observation about the ascendance in adjudication of
organizations, in light of the older claim that the haves
come out ahead. My question is this: Relative to the
baseline established by the older article, is today's claim
good news or bad? Should the realization that adjudication
tends increasingly to be dominated by artificial rather than
by natural persons exacerbate our distress about the unfair
advantage enjoyed by haves or mitigate it?
I don't presume in these brief comments to present a
balanced view or reach a confident conclusion. Instead I list
a number of considerations that support what I shall call
the mitigation hypothesis: the organizational identity of
many present-day litigants may partially off-set or alleviate
the unfairness of the legal advantages wealth secures. The
tentative "may" must be doubly stressed, however. First,
whether the ascendance of organizations has mitigating
effects depends on various facts, many of which are
unavailable or unclear. Secondly, in some instances the
facts as we know them do not support the mitigation
hypothesis. In these instances the main significance of the
considerations I mention is in suggesting an unrealized
potential in our coming to terms with "the organizational
revolution"4 and perhaps in hinting at the direction of some
ameliorative steps.
I. THE HETEROGENEITY OF APs
Let me start by highlighting the relevance to my
mitigation hypothesis of one aspect of the ascendancy of
APs that was stressed in today's lecture: their
heterogeneity. In the organizational arena, we commonly
associate the haves with business corporations. But as Prof.
Galanter himself reminds us, not all organizations belong to
this category: there are also nonprofit organizations,
voluntary associations, trade unions, governmental or semi-
governmental agencies, and the like. These APs do not
always possess great wealth or cater to the interests of
those who do. All the same, they bring to litigation many of
the advantages that the wealthier, corporate APs have.
4. See KENNETH E. BOULDING, THE ORGANIZATIONAL REVOLUTION: A STUDY IN
THE ETHICS OF ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1953).
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These non-corporate organizations should be able to extract
some of the gains that would have otherwise supposedly
accrued to wealthy litigants. Non-corporate organizations
can exert within litigation a countervailing power which
effectively cancels out at least to some degree the relative
advantages of business corporations, as well as those of
wealthy individuals.
In retrospect, this has been one of Prof. Galanter's main
messages from the start. This message is somewhat
disguised by the title of his article which focuses on the
litigation advantages of wealth. But part of the novelty of
that article was to draw attention to another and
independent set of variables which secure such advantages,
namely those having to do with organizational structure.
Indeed the main mechanism Galanter identified as
responsible for the distortions he discussed, that of being a
repeat-player, is more directly associated with organization
than with wealth. This insight also underlies the main
normative suggestions of the old piece, namely that
organizational advantages can be harnessed and
strategically deployed to advance the interests of the have-
nots. If anything, the developments that occupy today's
lecture increase the relevance of those suggestions, perhaps
with an added twist. The increased relevance comes from
the fact that the more business corporations occupy center
stage, the stronger the argument for enhancing the role of
other, countervailing organizations. The twist concerns the
changed role of government in this. The countervailing
power imagery harks back to a vision of society as composed
of individuals who seek shelter in the bosom of
"intermediate institutions" from the alienating brutality of
the state. But in the Planet of the APs, populated as it is by
corporations and other organizations, government agencies
may themselves assume the role of intermediate
institutions designed this time to protect individuals
against the alienating excesses of corporate power. 5 Some of
the legal developments Prof. Galanter reports seem to fit
this pattern, though, judging by his data, all too feebly and
hesitantly. Still, the potential for a realignment of
5. For a fuller development of this theme, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Between




organizational forces is there, giving new vitality to some of
Prof. Galanter's old recommendations.
II. ARE CORPORATIONS "HAVES"?
I turn now to business corporations, the prime
contenders for the position of today's haves. My second
point is that even they don't quite qualify as "haves" in the
sense relevant to the title of Prof. Galanter's older article.
Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead is doubtlessly meant to
deliver a strong rhetorical punch. This punch draws its
force from at least two different sources, and it is important
for present purposes to clearly distinguish them. The first
concerns matters of commutative justice. Seen in these
terms, Prof. Galanter's title pertains to a perturbing reality
in which some legal decisions are allegedly reached not just
on the merits but are instead influenced by extrinsic,
immaterial considerations. Here the appeal is to the
injustice of any biased or arbitrary judicial decision-making
in contravention of the law. Any failure to decide cases
exclusively on the merits amounts to a breach of
commutative justice and is deplorable for this reason alone.
But this construal of the question's rhetorical force, though
valid, does not engage the rather striking language in
which the question is posed. In particular, the expression
"haves" adds measurably to the question's rhetorical force.
How? As we all know, "haves" is regularly used in
conjunction with and in juxtaposition to "have-nots." The
title of Prof. Galanter's article is a deliberately provocative
allusion to this disturbing polarity. But why is the polarity
disturbing? The answer obviously resides in our sensibility
toward distributive unfairness. As an affective matter, the
label "haves" evokes such emotions as envy, and "have-nots"
compassion. More importantly, the polarity triggers
considerations of distributive justice. Though, depending on
one's theory of justice and on the details of the economic
situation, a stark division between haves and have-nots
may not necessarily condemn a society as unjust, yet the
division does at least present a prima facie problem and so
demands a justification.
To distinguish more clearly the commutative justice
and the distributive justice misgivings induced by
Galanter's title, consider a restricted segment of
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adjudication, consisting of tied cases. By a tied case I mean
one in which the result reached by the best application of
the relevant legal materials is indeterminate, so that legal
experts would divide evenly on the correct result or agree
that none is prescribed.6 Now in a tied case neither party
has, or at any rate can establish, a right to win, so any
result would seem to comport with commutative justice
concerns. Nonetheless, I take it that we would be more
perturbed to learn that wealthy litigants win the
preponderance of these cases than if the outcomes turned
out to be randomly distributed. If so, then there is
something offensive in legal decisions tracking wealth that
goes beyond concerns of commutative justice; considerations
of distributive justice would seem to plausibly come into
play. What are they? This is not the place for a thorough
inquiry into this large topic, but two suggestions can be
briefly made. One is that insofar as we find the initial
division between haves and have-nots disturbing or at least
suspect, a pattern of judicial decisions that favors the
wealthy exacerbates the problem simply by increasing the
gap.
Though this interpretation of the rhetorical force of
Galanter's usage is plausible, its edge is bound to be
blunted in a capitalist system in which people are
accustomed to seeing wealth generate more wealth. In other
words, though this interpretation does address the use of
the expression "haves," it does not take account of the
judicial context of Galanter's original complaint. Why is it
particularly objectionable when wealth produces more
wealth in the context of adjudication? My second suggestion
does accordingly address the special link between
distributive concerns and adjudication. It does so by
highlighting the central role that a single core value,
human dignity, plays in both. The distributive significance
6. Compare John E. Coons, Approaches to Court Imposed Compromise-the
Uses of Doubt and Reason, 58 Nw. U. L. REV. 750 (1964), in which the author
recommends court mandated compromises in a number of "tie" situations which
he identifies. See in particular the category of "doubt-compromise" and his
related "argument from indeterminacy." Id. at 754-73. Despite Ronald
Dworkin's well-known and highly contested argument to the contrary (e.g., in
RONALD DWORKIN, Can Rights be Controversial?, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
279 (1977)), most lawyers probably believe that indeterminate cases exist and
indeed abound; but for the sake of the present thought experiment we need not
enter the fray but can simply stipulate their existence.
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of dignity can be best expressed in Ronald Dworkin's
felicitous phrase: people's equal moral worth entitles them
to be treated with equal concern and respect.7 The actual
distributive implications will of course depend on how the
italicized expression is unpacked. But even if great
disparities in wealth do not by themselves offend against
human dignity, they create a suspicion and shift the burden
of persuasion, especially so in light of the higher social
status associated with wealth: though rites of differential
social deference are perhaps consistent with a strict
observance of equal moral respect, the line is not always
clearly visible or easy to draw. The connection between
dignity and adjudication is familiar too. As others have
argued, by complying with the requirements of the rule of
law, with its insistence on rational justification and
impartiality, courts publicly affirm the equal moral worth of
every human being.8 We can now link the two observations,
the one about distributive justice and the one about
adjudication, by treating in the present context wealth as-
to borrow the terminology of anti-discrimination law-a
''suspect category": a pattern of judicial decisions that
favors the haves carries particularly invidious expressive
implications. Taking place as it does within the very
sanctuary of human dignity, such a pattern will have the
connotations or overtones of a public proclamation that the
rich occupy a higher moral plane. 9
If these comments are on the right track, they not only
explain why a pattern of disproportionate litigation gains
by wealthy individuals is troublesome, but also why a
similar pattern pertaining to business corporations is less
so. To begin with, distributive justice is concerned with the
welfare of natural, not artificial persons; business
corporations are simply not its proper subjects, and so the
accumulations of capital they represent are not by
themselves in the nature of distributive aberrations. To be
7. E.g., in RONALD DWORKIN, Liberalism, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181
(1985).
8. See, e.g., JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY
OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210 (1979).
9. For recent discussions of the importance of the expressive aspect of law,
see Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943
(1995) and Cass Sunstein, The Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021 (1996).
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envious of a wealthy corporation is akin to begrudging a car
(rather than its owner) its large engine, and to have
egalitarian anxieties with regard to corporate wealth is no
lesser a category mistake than having moral compunctions
about the unequal treatment of different cars. As long as we
think of the corporation as a separate entity, such
responses as we may have to excessive individual wealth
are out of place. Now if corporate wealth does not raise
issues of distributive justice in the first place, an increase in
that wealth through law suits does not by itself raise such
issues either.
As the italicized words in the last sentence signal, this
conclusion is limited, but it is significant nonetheless. It is a
caveat against the familiar but still common
anthropomorphic fallacy of transferring to organizations
attitudes and norms that originate in interpersonal human
relationships. Though the fallacy is easy to diagnose, it is
apparently more difficult to remedy. Its entrenchment can
be perhaps traced to the fact that it is sustained by two
opposing views regarding corporations, and provides a point
of convergence for otherwise warring camps: those who
consider organizations as single entities and therefore as
individual persons, and those who deny any independent
reality to organizations and treat them as simple aggregates
of individual persons. The challenge rather is to maintain a
cognitive grip on the unity of the corporation as a distinctive
entity without anthropomorphizing it in either way. I take
it that this is the conception of corporations that Prof.
Galanter's APs imagery is meant to espouse. If so, he would
probably agree that the resources at the disposal of these
entities are not the moral equivalent of excessive individual
wealth. When Ms. Rich wins a law suit against Mr. Poor,
the distributive results are clear. Not so in the case of a
corporate victory. To assess the distributive effects of Mr.
Poor's loss to, say, AT&T, we must ask a further question:
Who exactly benefits from AT&T's legal gains? I intend to
take here full advantage of the commentator's prerogative
of raising questions without answering them, but I do wish
to highlight the difficulty of answering this question:
tracing corporate gains to the eventual individual
beneficiaries is no simple matter; there simply is no
straightforward and necessary connection between a
corporation's fortunes and any particular distributive
pattern. It all depends on such factors as how widely the
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shareholding is dispersed; how effective the mechanisms of
translating corporate gains into shareholders' benefits are;
who the institutional investors are and whose interests do
they serve (as, e.g., in the case of pension funds or
insurance companies), and so on. This is not all. Though
effects on shareholders are the most direct and conspicuous,
they are not the only ones. There are other stakeholders in
the corporation, such as employees and consumers, to
whose advantage the corporation's increased assets may
also redound.
Since corporate wealth is in principle consistent with
indefinite distributive patterns, corporate gains in courts
may not have the dilatory material effects of increasing the
disparities of wealth among individuals or the invidious
expressive effects of treating some individuals with lesser
concern and respect than others. Obviously, both of these
mitigating factors are matters of degree. The more widely
dispersed the effects of corporate gains, the less significant
the material outcome of a corporation's advantages and the
more muted the negative message sent.'(
III. CORPORATE NORMATIVE VULNERABILITY
Even if corporations are to be seen as haves in the
relevant critical sense, they represent a normatively
vulnerable breed of haves. What I mean by this can be best
gleaned from Prof. Galanter's observation that "American
courts have been receptive to the notion that corporate
actors are persons or entities with rights of their own rather
than merely creatures of the state or instruments of NPs."11
Significantly, this observation is intended as a criticism,
and equally significantly, no such criticism could be voiced
with regard to the law's treatment of wealthy individuals: a
complaint that the law treats, say, Bill Gates or Donald
Trump as a person rather than as a mere instrument would
not cut much ice. The Kantian overtones are not
10. But lest this conclusion be the occasion for premature or excessive
rejoicing, it must be also recognized that its practical significance rides entirely
on the crucial "in principle" proviso and on the actual facts. For a recent study
of the dispersion of shares in American corporations, see Yoser Gadhoum, Larry
H.P. Lang & Leslie Young, Who Controls Us?, 11 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 339 (2005),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=399801.
11. Galanter, supra note 3, at 1404.
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adventitious here. It has become common ground to view
individuals' autonomy and dignity as the source of their
categorical rights. These rights are categorical in the sense
that they prohibit sacrificing certain individual interests
even when doing so would promote the aggregate welfare of
society as a whole. Such rights accordingly constrain what
the government can do to individuals in carrying out its
policies, no matter how socially desirable. 12 Extending to
corporations individual rights, as Prof. Galanter indicates
courts often do, is another instance of the anthropomorphic
fallacy I have already mentioned. To take corporations'
organizational form seriously, as Prof. Galanter has
soundly done today, is precisely to acknowledge their
distinctive nature as instruments whose legitimacy and
legal status derive from the human purposes they serve,
and thus to remove them from the domain of categorical
rights appropriate to individuals conceived as ends in
themselves. As I have argued at greater length elsewhere,
doing so does not strip corporations of their legal rights.13
Protecting such rights may advance society's aggregate
welfare, or help secure indirectly the interests of some
individuals. But in neither case do corporate rights have the
scope or the categorical force of the corresponding
individual rights; consequently, the legal rights of
corporations can be circumscribed more narrowly and
curtailed more readily than those of individuals. Protected
by more narrowly circumscribed and weaker rights,
corporations can be envisaged as shielded by a thinner
normative armour than individuals. Hence their greater
normative vulnerability.
I will not try to replicate here in detail the arguments
for this conclusion, but their gist can be briefly indicated.
Consider a case in which an individual's legal right runs up
against social policy, so that upholding the right in the
12. This formulation of the role of rights is mostly based on ROBERT NOZICK,
ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 26 (1974) and on RONALD DWORKIN, Taking Rights
Seriously, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 6, at 184. "Common ground"
is not to be understood as unanimity, of which none is to be expected in these
matters.
13. See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL
THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY (1986). For a detailed application of the
approach I outline here to a particular right, freedom of speech, see my
Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by
Organizations, Communities, and the State, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1229 (1991).
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particular case would involve a significant toll in aggregate
welfare. Arguably, the right ought to be upheld nonetheless.
Letting the policy override the right would amount to
sacrificing the individual to the community at large and
hence be a failure to respect the individual as an end in
herself. By contrast, overriding a corporation's right under
similar circumstances does not have such invidious
meaning. The right bearer in this case is the corporate
entity itself, an entity which on the ends/means divide falls
distinctly on the latter side. To be sure, a decision that
curtails the corporation's alleged right is likely to indirectly
affect the interests of numerous individuals. But because
the individuals so affected are numerous, remain
anonymous, and the effect on them is indirect, their claims
in the instant case do not have greater moral force than
that of all the other individuals that would supposedly
benefit from the policy the decision promotes.
The upshot of these considerations is that law has much
greater elbow room in dealing with corporations than with
individuals. There is, of course, a lively debate concerning
the desirable level of control by government, including the
judiciary, over corporations. My present aim is not to enter
this debate but only to point out that its terms are, or at
any rate ought to be, very different from those that define
the government's and the courts' reach in respect to
individuals. Similar reasons to those just mentioned in my
previous comment and which reduce the moral significance
of corporate legal gains also attenuate the significance of
their losses. Being social instruments par excellence,
corporations can be subjected, when the social interest so
demands, to more exacting standards and to stricter
regulation than would be appropriate in the case of the
law's individual subjects, be they indigent or wealthy.
IV. APs AND ACCESS TO JUSTICE
The allegation that the haves, or organizations, come
out ahead conjures up an imagery of a race to justice in
which some are unfairly beaten to the finishing line. But
another theme in today's lecture concerns the displacement
of individuals by organizations in court: as the number of
organizational litigants increases, that of individual
litigants declines. In terms of the race-to-justice metaphor
this point is not so much about being beaten to the finishing
1436 [Vol. 53
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line as not even making it to the starting line. We are faced,
in other words, with an instance of the troubling issue of
access to justice. Now once again, my aim in not to assess
the displacement of individuals in the courts; I take it for
granted that individuals' reduced access is deplorable. My
question is a narrower one: Does the fact that the
displacement is by organizations rather than by wealthy
individuals offer some offsetting advantages? And here too I
raise some considerations that suggest an affirmative
answer.
The main basis for this answer was provided in today's
lecture when Prof. Galanter drew our attention to a salient
phenomenon. Sometimes referred to as "legalization," it is
the process by which organizations internalize legal
standards, structures, and procedures, thereby turning into
mini-legal-systems themselves. 14 This is in part simply a
matter of the proximity between the imperatives of
bureaucracy and those of legality famously noted by
Weber. 15  But legalization is also a response by
organizations to more specific demands that the external
legal environment places on them. Prof. Galanter quotes a
number of studies that document this development in some
detail, but for most of us this development is known first
hand as a matter of daily experience. For an example
outside of the corporate world we don't need to look very
far. Just think of the processes and procedures governing
almost every aspect of university life. But the same is true
of business corporations as well. As a humdrum example,
consider the typical experience of dealing with an insurance
company. You file a claim; the claim is reviewed by an
official who evaluates it in light of strict rules and policies.
The money to be paid out does not belong to the claims
representative. She may be motivated by excessive loyalty
or identification with the company, but she cannot be
14. For a helpful overview and update, see Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C.
Suchman, When the "Haves" Hold Court: Speculations on the Organizational
Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & Soc'y REV. 941, 946-48 (1999). The source of
this line of thinking is MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATION (1947). The modern locus classicus for the notion of legalization
in the organizational context is PHILIP SELZNICK, LAw, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL
JUSTICE (1969). See also Lon L. Fuller, who derives the principles of the rule of
law from what he takes to be the imperatives of governance, in THE MORALITY
OF LAW (rev. ed. 1969).
15. See WEBER, supra note 14.
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motivated by greed. She acts in an impersonal manner both
in the sense that her own interests are not at stake, and in
the sense that she treats you as a "claimant" in abstraction
from your other properties and traits. These common
experiences form the relevant backdrop or baseline for
assessing the normative significance of increased
organizational dominance in the courts. How, in terms of
access to justice, do individuals of all socio-economic stripes
fair in the Planet of the APs compared to their prospects in
the older planet, in which natural persons predominated? 16
In reflecting on this issue we should beware of the
expression that is commonly used to label it. Prof. Galanter
has documented today individuals' reduced access to the
courts. Labeling it a matter of access to justice begs some
important questions worth pondering, such as why exactly
is access to the courts desirable and important, and how
good are the courts in dispensing justice, in absolute terms
or in comparison with other potential providers? These are
widely debated questions, and all I can do here is offer a few
brief notes in the margin of this debate. To somewhat
simplify matters, I focus exclusively on civil litigation,
which is anyway the main terrain covered by Prof.
Galanter's report. A good starting point, and one that is
continuous with my pervious remarks, is to inquire about
the justice courts are expected to secure. We commonly
distinguish between substantive and procedural justice,
and since courts are thought to serve both, our inquiry must
proceed along two lines. First, then, what is the substantive
justice courts serve in civil cases? A plausible, if not
uncontested answer (nothing at all in this area is
uncontested) is that the rules and standards that guide
court decisions in these cases are just in as much as they
have adequate democratic credentials. One thing that
contributes to the plausibility of this answer is its
vagueness, since its key notion of "adequate democratic
support" is not well defined. Nonetheless, the answer does
shift primary attention from the courts to legislatures, the
main forums in which political accommodations are
democratically hammered out. Though courts do not just
mechanically apply statutory provisions, the substantive
16. For some pertinent reflections on the difficulties of answering this
question, see Richard Lempert, A Classic at 25. Reflections on Galanter's
"Haves"Article and Work It has Inspired, 33 LAw & Soc'y REV. 1099 (1999).
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legitimacy of their judgments does to a large extent derive
from their subservience to legislative control.
But if so, our satisfaction with the substantive justice
meted out by APs should also depend on the degree to
which the rules and standards that guide their interactions
with individuals have adequate democratic support. There
is much talk about democratization of corporations, and
this mostly refers to increasing the power of shareholders
and perhaps other constituencies such as employees as well.
I don't mean to downplay the potential of such reforms to
advance genuine internal democratization and of their
ability to make the norms that guide corporations fairer
and more just. But I'd like to point out that there is also
room for what we may think of as external democratization,
which comes in the form of greater legislative and
administrative control over the rules and standards that
guide corporate relationships with individuals. Here my
present comment links up with the previous one concerning
the normative vulnerability of organizations. To see the
point, consider contracts as an example. When contracts are
envisaged as agreements among individuals, there is a
strong argument for government to stay its hand. It is at
least plausible to consider such contracts as occasions for
the exercise and affirmation of individual autonomy, which
mandatory contractual terms dictated by the state are
likely to compromise. But in -the case of contracts of
adhesion generated by an impersonal organizational
bureaucracy, this argument against government
intervention does not apply. Rather than being the products
of the reciprocal adjustment of the parties' free will, these
contracts resemble more closely the unilateral generation of
binding norms by administrative agencies and by
legislatures themselves. They might as well be subject to
close scrutiny and modification by institutions and
processes that enjoy a broad democratic mandate.
The extent to which such scrutiny and modification do
in fact take place is primarily a matter of legislative and
administrative action or inaction. It is, in other words, a
political matter. So if there is too little democratic oversight
of the norms that guide organizations in their relations
with individuals, and consequently a substantive justice
deficit, the political process is to blame. This blame may be
born by many factors, but one of them is likely to be
corporations' political leverage and the degree to which it
1439
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allows them to displace individuals in the political arena.
Such displacement, insofar as it takes place, is doubtlessly
a subversion and an aberration of democracy. But this is no
longer a matter of individuals' reduced access to the courts
but a matter of their losing democratic control over the
legislatures and the administration.
The procedural justice expected of courts is for the most
part subsumed under the rule of law ideal. The ideal is
broad and somewhat vague, but its gist is that decisions
that bear directly on people's rights and interests ought to
be made in an impartial and non-arbitrary way, but rather
in light of preexisting general rules and standards. So to
assess the displacement of individuals by organizations in
respect of procedural justice we must ask: What are the
contemporary sites of the rule of law? Where are its virtues
present and its ideals realized? Has it shrunk or expanded?
I don't pretend to have a confident answer, but the data
recounted in the lecture and the first-hand anecdotal
experience to which I've alluded suggest that the answers to
these questions point to organizations and their internal
processes and procedures. The inevitable conclusion is that
the ascendance of organizations involves intra-
organizational gains in rule of law terms that offset in part
or in whole the losses that result from the displacement of
natural persons from the courts.
Assessing the ascendance of organizational justice
beyond this minimal conclusion is a difficult matter that
requires considerable further study. The main question to
be explored is, how do individuals, and specifically the
have-nots, fair overall in the new, organizational regime
compared with how they faired or would have faired in a
world in which procedural justice is the exclusive domain of
courts? What complicates the assessment is the general
impression that many more individuals have access to
organizational procedural justice than they had or would
have had to the courts, but that the justice to which they
have access appears to be shakier and of a more dubious
quality. The new sites of rule of law virtues may be making
up in volume what they lack in thoroughness or depth; but
the proper rate of exchange between quality and quantity is
at this point anyone's guess. Beyond thus suggesting
directions for further study and reflection, today's lecture
has implications for policy and reform. If large business
corporations and other organizations are here to stay in
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roughly their present shape, it may make more sense to
improve the quality of justice they provide than to try to
expand individuals' access to the courts.
The suggestion that the main locus of rule of law values
has migrated from courts to organizations may be greeted
with skepticism for a number of reasons. Let me mention
two. One concerns impartiality. Recall my example of the
typical handling of an insurance claim. How can we speak
of impartiality when an insurance company's claims officer
is in charge? Isn't the organization necessarily the partial
decision maker in its own case? That the answer is in
principle negative can be seen by contemplating the case of
the state, the original home of the rule of law. After all, if
we think of the state as an entity, which we commonly do as
much as of any collective entity, then the state would be by
necessity the prime offender against the rule of law in all
cases to which it is a party. But this is not quite how we
view matters. Though courts are state institutions, they can
enjoy a measure of independence that allows them to serve
rather than subvert the rule of law even in cases which
directly involve the state. 17 The general lesson is that
organizational unity is a matter of degree, and that within
what we take to be a single organization there can exist
semi-independent sub-units which march to a different
drum from other units in the same outfit. This possibility is
sometimes a source of organizational dysfunction leading to
what organization theorists call "goal displacement."' 8 But
the same phenomenon may also be harnessed to serve
impartiality, thus removing the air of paradox from the idea
of an organization being impartial with regard to its own
affairs.
17. This, though, is a matter both of degree and of controversy. There is
considerable literature maintaining that courts are in fact partial when the
state is involved, and that they only rule against the state to the extent needed
to preserve its legitimacy. For a fairly recent survey of and contribution to this
literature, see Ronen Shamir, "Landmark Cases" and the Production of
Legitimacy: the Case of Israel's High Court of Justice, 24 LAw & SoC'y REV. 781
(1990), and sources cited therein.
18. E.g., W. Keith Warner & A. Eugene Havens, Goal Displacement and the
Intangibility of Organizational Goals, 12 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 539, 545 (1968);




The insurance claim example will also serve to
illustrate the second skeptical response. Dealings with
insurance companies-and with bureaucracies more
generally-can be quite frustrating, and this frustration
may make us scoff at the association between these
experiences and such a high minded ideal as the rule of law.
It can be said in response that, though the list of the virtues
of the rule of law varies somewhat, freedom from
frustration has never been on it; and that dealing with the
courts isn't on the whole a relaxing experience either.
My final point, however, one which somewhat qualifies
the upbeat tone of my remarks, is a reminder that the
virtues of the rule of law, like those of bureaucracy which it
resembles, though real enough, are cold virtues; and to this
extent the positive aspects of the ascendance of APs that
I've listed, even if true, can offer us only cold comfort.
CONCLUSION
I have mentioned at the outset a connection between
Prof. Galanter's earlier article and today's talk. I'd like to
conclude by pointing out another link between the two,
having to do with their titles. The Planet of the APs is a
gripping metaphor which, just as the article's provocative
title has done, helps fix in our minds a bit of social reality
so pervasive that it is for that very reason all too easy to
overlook or ignore. For the most part today's lecture was
concerned with describing this reality and analyzing it, but
such description and analysis have inescapably, and I'm
sure intentionally, normative ramifications as well.
Whether eagerly or gingerly we find ourselves asking: Are
the transformations of the legal scene that form the subject
matter of today's lecture good or bad? In pursuing this
question, my comments drew on and were meant to
highlight a striking feature of the corporate economy.
Vesting the ownership of capital in an impersonal entity
introduces a separation between the imperatives of an
efficient allocation of resources and those of a just
distribution of wealth. This makes it in principle possible to
combine the advantages of a competitive market and of
large and highly coordinated ventures on the one side with
a more egalitarian distribution of individual wealth and of
the fair and even-handed treatment of individual rights
and interests than we could otherwise attain, on the other.
1442 [Vol. 53
2006] IN (FAINT) PRAISE OF THE LARGE APs 1443
At least some of the worries associated with the advantages
corporations enjoy in court may be mitigated in light of
these options.
But the mitigation depends on the extent to which
these options are taken advantage of and realized. This in
turn depends on the workings of the political process. It is
here that the increasing dominance of APs, especially
business corporations, is of greatest concern. This is so not
only because of the distortion of democracy that corporate
political influence involves, but also because that influence
may block the way for those very changes and reforms that
could make the ascendancy of APs more welcome and
benign. So perhaps the most urgent question raised by
today's talk is whether the golem is already out of hand,
and whether taming it for the benefit of individuals is still
an option.

